Book Review: A Lawyer Looks at the Equal Rights Amendment, by Rex E. Lee by Ramey, Drucilla S.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
1982
Book Review: A Lawyer Looks at the Equal Rights
Amendment, by Rex E. Lee
Drucilla S. Ramey
Golden Gate University School of Law, dramey@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1011 (1982)
BOOK REVIEW 
A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, by Rex E. 
Lee. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1980, pp. xiii+ 
141. $18.50. 
The proposed Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution, 
popularly known as the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), I has 
joined its predecessor ERA's in defeat. The failure to ratify by the nec-
essary thirty-eight states marks the end of the most sustained of the 
numerous campaigns waged this century for a constitutional guarantee 
of equality for women.2 
In the wake of the ERA's demise, Rex Lee's book, A Lawyer Looks 
at the Equal Rights Amendment,3 is instructive, not as an academic 
postmortem on the Amendment itself, but as a bellwether of the future 
prospects for constitutional equality of women in America. Rex Lee is 
currently the Solicitor General of the United States. As the chief ap-
pellate lawyer for the federal government, Lee occupies a position of 
paramount importance in the formulation and enforcement of the Rea-
gan administration's legal policies and positions in the area of civil 
rights.4 A distinguished law graduate of the University of Chicago, Lee 
was the founding Dean of Brigham Young University's fledgling law 
school and served briefly as Chief of the Civil Division of the Justice 
Department under President Gerald Ford. He brings to his current job 
a reputation as an outspoken opponent of judicial activism, a devout 
Mormon, and an articulate adversary of ERA proponents.s Lee's ef-
forts in this last regard have included service on the litigation board of 
the business-oriented "public interest" law firm that, during his board 
tenure, elected to represent Idaho and Arizona state legislators in their 
1. "SECTION 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of sex. 
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article. 
SECTION 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratifica-
tion." See S.l. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), H.R.l. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1971),86 Stat. 1523 (1972), 118 CONGo REC. 9598 (1972). 
2. For an in-depth historical discussion, see S. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL 
RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM BETWEEN THE WARS (1981). See also L. KA-
NOWITZ, EQUAL RIGHTS: THE MALE STAKE 61-74, 85-144 (1981). 
3. R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1980). 
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judicial challenge to Congress' three-year extension of the time period 
within which states could have ratified the ERA.6 
The early chapters of Lee's book present a relatively dispassionate 
historical analysis of the legal status of women in the United ,States. 
Lee first engages in a short discussion ofthe nation's historically perva-
sive pattern of discrimination against women. Sketching out instances 
of early statutory and constitutional "relegation of women to a legal 
status similar to that of slaves,"7 Lee notes that the very amendment 
intended to guarantee equality for blacks was the first to interject the 
word "male" into the Constitution.8 He briefly touches on the initial 
stages of nineteenth century legislative reform of the Draconian re-
straints on the ability of married women to own, control, and transfer 
their property, to control their wages, to engage in employment outside 
the home, and to own and control businesses.9 In a later chapter, Lee 
alludes to the continuing burdens imposed on women by these and nu-
merous other statutory disabilitie,s.1O ' 
Lee's argument against the ERA begins to take shape as he shifts 
his focus to constitutional history. He outlines the century of Supreme 
Court repudiation of challenges to sex-based legislation, brought first 
under the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities clause, 
subsequently under its due process provision, and ultimately, under its 
guarantee of equal protection. 11 Lee takes the position that the Court's 
continuing refusal, until 1971, to afford constitutional recourse for de-
nial of women's rights understandably sparked the current drive for a 
constitutional amendment guaranteeing gender equality. One basic 
premise of Lee's argument against the ERA in 1980, however, is that a 
decade of decisions under the Court's newly adopted "intermediate 
scrutiny" test for gender-based Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion claims has obviated the need for a constitutional amendment: 
Over the intervening decade [since 1971] the Supreme Court has 
developed a rather comprehensive body of case law dealing with 
sex discrimination. The standard is neither rational baSIS nor 
strict judicial scrutiny. It lies somewhere between the two. . . . 
[I]t is beyond dispute that the big leap has already been 
made. One of the proper roles for a constitutional amendment in 
achieving reform is to make large changes, to reach new ground 
previously unexplored. With respect to sex discrimination, a 
change of that magnitude was needed in 1971. It had been 
needed for decades and even centuries prior to 1971, but nothing 
6. Id at 3. 
7. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 4. 
8. Id at 6. 
9. Id at 5. 
10. Id at 69-73. 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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had happened. Today, the situation is very different. There is no 
longer any question whether equality is constitutionally guaran-
teed to women. It is. 12 
1013 
In support of this position, Lee carefully traces for his lay audience 
the development and nature of an "intermediate scrutiny" test under 
the Fourteenth Amendment for sex-based classifications. Prior to 1971, 
he explains, challenges to gender-based classifications were doomed to 
failure because of the Court's use of the traditional "rational basis" 
standard of review in equal protection cases. 13 Lee explains how the 
strong presumption of legitimacy accorded to legislative enactments 
has been held to require persons challenging a legislative classification 
to prove that the distinction is not rationally related to any conceivable 
legitimate governmental objective, regardless of the state's actual basis 
in fact for creating the classification. By contrast, in cases where the 
nature of the classification is found to be "suspect," giving rise to the 
presumption that its purpose is invidious, a "strict scrutiny" test is ap-
plied. This requires the government to bear the burden of proving that 
the classification is necessary to the achievement of a compelling state 
interest. As Lee correctly concludes, few classifications can be found 
invalid under the former test, while virtually none will survive the 
latter. 14 
By 1971, the only "suspect" classifications subject to strict scrutiny 
were those based on race,15 national origin,16 and alienage. 17 Lee ob-
serves with approval that only a plurality of the Supreme Court held in 
1973 that gender-based classifications were suspect classifications sub-
ject to strict scrutiny.18 A majority of the Court has been marshalled 
only in support of the curious hybrid standard appropriately dubbed 
"intermediate scrutiny."19 
Although the Court's decisions under this standard have been in-
consistent and increasingly problematical, the test has generally been 
held to place the burden on the government2° to prove that the sex-
based classification is substantially related to achievement of an impor-
tant governmental objective,21 which must transcend mere administra-
12. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 83. 
13. Id. at 23-25. 
14. Id. at 11-12. 
15. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
16. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
17. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
18. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
19. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 23-31. 
20. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 460 n.7 (1981); Personnel Adm'r v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). 
21. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976). 
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tive ease and convenience.22 Further, the government must make a 
persuasive factual showing both that the classification closely serves the 
goal that was, in fact, the basis for the distinction,23 and that a gender-
neutral scheme would not serve the objective equally as well.24 Finally, 
in scrutinizing classifications purportedly established to benefit women, 
the Court has attempted to draw a distinction between those whose 
purpose is "benign and compensatory," and therefore permissible, and 
those founded on "archaic and overbroad'~ generalizations as to the 
proper roles of women and men, and therefore constitutionally imper-
missible.25 As discussed later in this review,26 the continuing vitality of 
intermediate scrutiny, always a matter of doubt, has been seriously 
threatened by two recent decisions upholding, respectively, the exclu-
sion of women from draft registration27 and the exclusion of women 
from criminal liability for statutory rape.2s 
Lee's argum~nt against the ERA evolves from his comparison of 
the theory that he believes to underlie intermediate scrutiny with the 
results he foresees to be the outcome of judicial scrutiny under the 
ERA. Purporting to rely on the Amendment's legislative history and 
on general principles of constitutional law, Lee first explores the prob-
able standard of review that would be adopted by the courts in apply-
ing the ERA. He thereafter predicts the ERA's effect on existing law in 
the areas of compulsory military service, family law, education, and 
employment. The primary focus of his concern, however, centers on 
his conviction that the ERA will interfere with or invalidate govern-
mental efforts to regulate sexual activity per se in three areas: criminal 
sanctions for rape, laws limiting the rights of homosexuals, and laws or 
customs barring maintenance of coeducational dormitories in state in-
stitutions of higher learning.29 He is also deeply troubled by the ERA's 
implications for the future role of women in the draft and combat.30 
Lee's argument against the ERA is based essentially on two seem-
ingly contradictory propositions. On the one hand, he believes that the 
ERA lacks either practical or symbolic value because women have al-
ready achieved their constitutional guarantee of equality through the 
22. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 690; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 
(1971). 
23. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 200; Weinberger v. Weisenfe1d, 420 U.S. 636, 
648 (1975). 
24. See, e.g.. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 280. 
25. See, e.g., id at 279; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard. 
419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975). 
26. See text accompanying notes 76-91 infra. 
27. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
28. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
29. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 61-68. 
30. Id at 55-59. 
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intermediate scrutiny test.3l On the other hand, Lee also opposes the 
Amendment on the ground that it will compel judges to enforce its 
mandate of equality by invalidating existing classifications based on 
sex, some of which he believes to be in the public interest and to enjoy 
wide public support. He states, for example, "Several American exper-
iences of recent years-most notably the exclusion of women from 
draft registration in 1980-suggest that the national mood does not 
favor radical changes in limiting government's flexibility to treat wo-
men and men differently.'>32 Later, he adds: 
[O]ur national legislators-who usually are a fair bellwether of 
national public opinion-. . . determined that even if compul-
sory military service were to be reestablished, it would not apply 
to women. Under the ERA Congress would not have had that 
choice. Even as to one of the few ERA consequences on which 
everyone agrees, therefore, the 1980 draft experience shows that 
our nation is not at a point of consensus.33 
Regarding existing gender-based statutes regulating sexual conduct, 
Lee similarly notes: 
For some in our society, preservation of premarital virginity and 
avoidance of extramarital sex relations are moral values of the 
highest order. . . . Outmoded or not, they are important values 
to the people that hold them. The inability of state legislatures to 
use their best jud~ment in protecting against intrusion on such 
values would dimInish individual dignity and liberty.34 
He concludes that, "[T]he greater need is for flexibility in deter-
mining what kinds of distinctions between men and women are really 
in our national interests, and what kinds are not."35 
These excerpts aptly indicate Lee's position on the constitutional 
rights of women. First, he believes that state-sanctioned distinctions 
between men and women are and should be constitutionally permissi-
ble in an ill-defined group of cases in which a court finds the classifica-
tion to be in the national interest. This finding turns in substantial part 
on the court's perception of strong public support for the classification. 
Second, the proper standard of review for gender-based classifications 
must afford judges the flexibility to make these political judgments on a 
case-by-case basis. Third, women are nonetheless guaranteed equality 
under this standard because most of the sex-based laws that hurt them 
will be invalidated. Fourth, the standard of review required by the 
ERA wrongfully would compel judges to invalidate substantially all 
gender-based legislation, the "good" as well as the "bad." 
31. Id. at 83-85. 
32. Id. at 31. 
33. Id. at 86. 
34. Id. at 63. 
35. Id. at 84. 
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The most disturbing implication of Lee's argument is its ultimate 
relegation of the constitutional rights of women to what Professor Law-
rence Tribe calls "Gallup poll justice."36 Where women are concerned, 
the result is judicial reinforcement of the supposedly antiquated notion 
that a woman's place is in the home and a man's is in the world of 
affairs. 
Judicial deference to public opinion, in matters of sex discrimina-
tion, as in any other domain, is repugnant· to the fundamental princi-
ples of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. In 
condemning any "prescription for judicial submission to majoritarian 
prejudice,"37 Professor Tribe maintains that, "Liberals and conserva-
tives ought to agree that the one thing we do not need from our judges 
is a good nose for what the public wants and a readiness to bend the 
law-or break it-to keep judicial rulings in line with the majority 
mood."38 Professor Tribe views with alarm the attack by Lee's col-
league, Attorney General William French Smith, on the federal courts' 
stubborn refusal to yield to "the groundswell of conservatism evi-
denced by the 1980 election."39 
Judicial abdication to public sentiment is particularly insidious 
when applied in sex discrimination cases where, as in race cases, the 
same societal prejudices responsible for creation of the classification 
may then be used to sustain its validity. Courts have summarily re-
jected the conceptually similar "customer preference" argument urged 
by defendants in support of gender-based discrimination in employ-
ment cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40 
As stated by one court, "[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to 
allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine 
whether the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large 
extent, these very prejudices [Title III] was meant to overcome."41 
Lee correctly concludes that the mandate of the ERA admits of no 
such justification for gender-based distinctions. To the contrary, the 
Amendment's premise was that laws that distinguish between people 
on the basis of sex are illegal because they irrationally predicate gov-
ernmental allocation of legal rights and obligations on the irrelevant 
factor of gender, rather than on individual ability, need, or potential.42 
36. Tribe, Courts should not be crilicizedfor ignoring public opinion, 2 CAL. LAW. 11 
(1982). 
37. fd. at 12. 
38. fd. at 11. 
39. fd. at 12. 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-1 to -6, -8, -9, -13 to -17 (1964). 
41. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied,404 
U.S. 950 (1971). 
42. S. REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6, 11 (1972). For a detailed discussion of 
the Amendment's theory, see Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amend-
Summer 1982] BOOK REVIEW 1017 
Lee is also correct in assuming that courts, at a minimum, would have 
applied strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications challenged under the 
ERA.43 It has been argued that the Amendment's legislative history 
additionally would have compelled strict scrutiny of facially neutral 
laws that are shown to have a disparate impact on one sex-for exam-
ple, laws stating that "persons with primary responsibility for children 
under six need not apply." 
Protection against indirect, covert or unconscious sex discrimina-
tion is essential to supplement the absolute ban on explicit sex 
classifications of the Equal Rights Amendment. Past discrimina-
tion in education, training, economic status and other areas has 
created differences which could readily be seized upon to perpet-
uate discrimination under the guise of functional classifications. 
The courts will have to maintain a strict scrutiny of such classifi-
cations if the guarantees of the Amendment are to be effectively 
secured.44 
As Lee notes, courts might well have determined that the ERA's 
clear language and legislative history warranted use of an "absolute 
standard with qualifications.,,45 The authors of a law review article 
that was read into the Congressional Record as part of the Amend-
ment's legislative history assert: "The issue under the equal rights 
amendment cannot be different but equal, reasonable or unreasonable 
classification, suspect classification, fundamental interests, or the de-
mands of administrative expediency. Equality of rights means that sex 
is not a factor."46 This absolute bar on all gender-based classifications 
would have been subject to two narrow qualifications. First, traditional 
principles governing judicial balancing of constitutional rights would 
have been invoked in cases involving the countervailing right of pri-
vacy. Thus, a state could have continued to protect the rights of the 
individual to perform intimate .personal functions free of intrusion by 
members of the opposite sex.4 Similar balancing has been accom-
plished by courts in cases posing conflicts between First Amendment 
press rights and rights of criminal defendants under the Sixth 
ment: A Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Emerson]. See also B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ, & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S 
RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1977) [hereinafter cited as B. BROWN]. 
43. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 41-42. 
44. B. BRO)VN, supra note 42, at 17, citing Emerson, supra note 42, at 900. The authors 
argue that although the Court has largely rejected this argument in race cases brought under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), most such laws 
in sex cases arise from systematic exclusion of women from all but traditional domestic 
roles, which would place them within the group of cases excluded from the Washington rule. 
B. BROWN supra note 42, at 18. 
45. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 47. 
46. Emerson, supra note 42, at 892. 
47. B. BROWN, supra note 42, at 15. 
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Amendment.48 
A second qualification would have held permissible gender-based 
distinctions based on physical, presumably sexual, characteristics nec-
essarily and uniquely found in one sex. These classifications would 
have been subject to strict scrutiny and limited to designations such as 
sperm donor or wet-nurse. Lastly, contrary to Lee's implication, it is 
exceedingly unlikely that the ERA would have been held to bar gen-
der-based affirmative action plans. Rather, courts would have looked 
to the ERA's overriding purpose and upheld as consistent with that 
purpose a true affirmative action program that met qualifications simi-
lar to those established for racial programs in United Steelworkers v. 
Weber.49 
By its terms, the ERA would not have been self-enforcing, but 
rather would have required citizens' groups, legislators, litigants, and 
judges to implement its mandate. At the very least, the Amendment 
would have served as a basis for judicial development of a coherent 
approach to sex discrimination cases. It would also have stimulated 
states to reexamine the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of gender-based 
statutes that remain on their books and to reevaluate these laws' contin-
ued viability under the ERA. Most important, the ERA would serve in 
the long run as a basis for affirmative legislation implementing its 
promise of equal opportunity. 
Curiously, Lee's most passionate arguments against the Amend-
ment are not based on its potential for redistributing burdens and bene-
fits, but rather on the threat he perceives it to pose to his own standards 
of morality. Accordingly, he directs his arguments to the ERA's real or 
imagined prospective impact on laws controlling sexual activity. With 
respect to these prohibitions, Lee expresses the fear that courts will 
somehow run amuck under the ERA, invalidating statutes willy-nilly, 
with no regard for ordinary jurisprudential principles or public opin-
ion. 50 His case for this scenario is weak. The judiciary is a notoriously 
conservative institution, which historically has manifested few revolu-
tionary tendencies in the area of sex discrimination. Indeed, the most 
radical example that Lee can cite from all court decisions implementing 
state ERA's, is a decision requiring a school district to allow two girls, 
weighing, respectively, 170 and 212 pounds, to play on their high 
school football team with the coach's enthusiastic support.51 In fact, as 
Lee concedes, judicial experience with state ERA's demonstrates that 
courts have sought to enforce these amendments in as uncontroversial a 
48. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); R. LEE, supra note 3, 
at 85. 
49. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
50. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 85-90. 
51. Id at 52, citing Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). 
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manner as possible.52 It is true, however, that the ERA and its state 
counterparts closely limit judicial discretion in an area where discretion 
historically has been abused to deny vindication of individual rights. 
In analyzing specific areas of the ERA's impact, Lee's tunnel vi-
sion on the issue of sexual morality leads to deceptively skewed and 
often incorrect results. In the area of criminal justice, for example, he 
ignores the Amendment's major potential impact on gender-based laws 
that differentially define crimes, imp'ose penalties, and determine con-
ditions of imprisonment for males and females.53 Lee instead concen-
trates on two areas in which the ERA would have had little or no 
meaningful impact. He first raises the specter of judicial abolition of 
gender-specific rape laws, only to then acknowledge that the ERA, at 
most, would have resulted in continuing punishment of vaginal rape 
under a new, gender-neutrallabeP4 Lee makes a second emotionally 
charged argument that the ERA would be held to abolish laws 
criminalizing or otherwise burdening homosexual conduct. 55 This ar-
gument is untenable in light of the Amendment's legislative history to 
the contrary56 and the judiciary's unequivocal rejection of this theory 
in analogous contexts.57 Title VII's proscription of employment dis-
crimination based on "sex," for example, uniformly has been held in-
applicable to claims of discrimination based on sexual preference.58 
Lee's analysis of the ERA's impact on public education betrays a 
similarly misplaced focus. His discussion omits any mention of the 
changes that would be effected in educationper se by the ERA, includ-
ing those in curriculum, class instruction, and counseling. The need for 
the Amendment in this area has become all the more evident with the 
advent of Republican leadership in Congress and an Executive Branch 
committed to strwping the federal statutes in this area of much of their 
force and effect.5 Of more significance to Lee are those areas, inciden-
tal to education, in which the ERA might increase the propinquity of 
52. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 51. 
53. See generally B. BROWN, supra note 42, at 66-96. 
54. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 62-64. 
55. Id. at 64-65. 
56. See Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 3.5-208 and Related Bills, and H.R. 916 and Related 
Bills, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1971). 
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title 
IV); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (Washington ERA does not 
invalidate a statute allowing only heterosexual marriages). 
58. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979), 
quoting Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Giving the 
statute [Title VII] its plain meaning, this court concludes that Congress had only the tradi-
tional notions of 'sex' in mind"); see also EEOC Empl. Prac. Dec. 76-75 (CCH) 11 6495 
(1976). 
59. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND ED-
UCATION OF WOMEN, SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TITLE IX: IMPACT ON 
POST-SECONDARY INSTITUTIONS (1981); ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES PROJECT 
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male and female students. Chief among his areas of concern is the 
Amendment's effect on coeducational student housing for those who 
desire it, in those state universities that do not already provide it. 60 Al-
though this narrow issue presents for Lee a conflict with his own 
strongly held, private standards of morality, it is not clear why his per-
sonal morals should serve as a basis for denying college students the 
right to live in cheap, coeducational state housing. Nor can this issue 
possibly assume the importance that Lee clearly accords it. 
Lee's lopsided approach is equally apparent in his brief discussion 
of employment. His focus .is on the ERA's admittedly nominal effect 
on sex-based state ~'protective" laws, which, he concedes, already have 
been legally invalidated by federal statute.61 Moreover, most courts 
that have applied state ERA's to these largely harmful statutes have 
utilized traditional rules of legislative interpretation and construction, 
striking down those that unreasonably burden one sex and, when con-
sistent with legislative history, rendering "gender-neutral" a statute 
that confers substantial benefits to one sex.62 
Ironically, Lee neglects to address the one issue of sexual segrega-
tion that is of paramount importance: the continuing segregation of 
women into "women's jobs" of low remuneration and limited opportu-
nities for advancement. In 1973, for example, over sixty percent of all 
working women were employed as clerical workers, service workers, or 
teachers.63 In 1977, women, who then comprised almost forty percent 
of the nation's full-time work force, earned only fifty-nine cents for 
every dollar earned by men, with female college graduates earning less 
than men who had failed to complete the ninth grade.64 
Both as a symbol of national commitment to equality for women 
and as a practical tool for enforcement of equal opportunity in public 
employment, the ERA would have played a major role in changing 
these statistics. Federal, state, and local governments together consti-
tute by far the largest employer in the nation, and one of the most dis-
criminatory. Seventy-eight percent of all federally employed women, 
for example, are concentrated in jobs rated GS-8 or below, on a scale 
from GS-l to GS-16, while seventy-three percent of all men are em-
ployed at GS-8 or higher.65 Continued wide use of sex-differentiated 
ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, ON CAMPUS WITH WOMEN 2-3 (No. 30 
Spring 1981). 
60. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 65-68. 
61. Id at 75-78. 
62. B. BROWN, supra note 42, at 29. 
63. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WOMEN'S Bu-
REAU 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 88 (1975). 
64. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, WOMEN'S BUREAU, THE EARN-
INGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 2, 4 (1979). 
65. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, ERA AND EMPLOYED WOMEN, (1981). 
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job titles, neutral job requirements that have a disparate impact on wo-
men, and sex-based benefit plans, would all be vulnerable to attack 
under the Amendment. 66 
It is true that the ERA would have merely supplemented existing 
state and federal fair employment and equal pay statutes. As a 
prominent figure in the Reagan administration, however, Lee would 
hardly have the temerity to argue that women should rest secure in the 
continuing vitality of laws currently on the President's chopping 
block.67 In fact, it is the very "correctability" of such legislation that 
commends to Lee the le~islative rather than the constitutional ap-
proach to these problems. 8 
Consonant with this view is Lee's preference for the "flexibility" of 
the intermediate constitutional scrutiny test in sex cases. Lee finds 
comfort in what he perceives to be its neutral approach to governmen-
tal enactments and its wide leeway for exercise of judicial discretion.69 
But, when the test has been applied in accordance with its own basic 
requirements, his perceptions are inaccurate. The test actually imposes 
an exceptionally heavy burden on the government to establish the clas-
sification's actual basis to be an important, nonstereotypical objective 
for which the gender-based distinction is carefully tailored.70 The 
Court's adherence to these well established principles has resulted in its 
invalidation of numerous federal and state gender-based statutes, many 
of which were enacted in the exercise of governmental powers tradi-
tionally accorded judicial deference. These include military7I and so-
cial security statutes,72 regulation of alcoholic beverages,73 and family 
lawenactments.74 
The Court has misapplied intermediate scrutiny, however, in cases 
where the state's ostensible objective was the "benign" purpose of 
"compensating" women for past and ongoing discrimination that itself 
is unaffected by the decision.75 The Court thus has failed to distinguish 
between true affirmative action, the goal of which is to change and 
66. See C. SAMUELS, THE FORGO'ITEN FIVE MILLION: WOMEN IN PUBLIC. EMPLOY-
MENT (1975). 
67. See, e.g., Lublin, Reagan's Advisors Accuse the EEOC of "Racism," Suggest Big Cut-
back, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 21, col. 4. 
68. R. LEE, supra note 3, at 86. 
69. It!. at 31. 
70. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra. 
71. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
72. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636 (1975). 
73. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
74. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 
(1979). 
75. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 
498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
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broaden the roles of women, and "compensation," which serves as a 
stopgap palliative, merely reinforcing existing discriminatory role pat-
terns. Such measures are never "benign." Moreover, these decisions 
reflect the Court's dangerous tendency in difficult cases to revert to the 
kind of judicial paternalism that has ill-served women for over a 
century. 
Never has this been as painfully clear as in two of the Court's 
opinions of the 1980-81 term, which together distort the intermediate 
scrutiny test beyond recognition. In upholding gender-based draft reg-
istration inRostker v. Goldberg76 and statutory rape laws in Michael M 
v. Superior Court,77 Justice Rehnquist and the Court's majority may 
well be signaling a dramatic retreat from the gains of the past decade. 
The implicit rationale of these decisions is, in essence, no different from 
that employed in 1873 by Justice Bradley in his now infamous concur-
ring opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois /8 which denied women the right to 
practice law because: 
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The nat-
ural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the fe-
male sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil 
life .... 
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill 
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law 
of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to 
the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon ex-
ceptional cases.79 
A similar rationale underlies the Court's 1908 decision in Muller v. Ore-
gon,80 in which women were found to be in need of "protection" in the 
workplace because: 
Even though all restrictions on political, personal and contractual 
rights were taken away . . . it would still be true that she is so 
constituted that she will look to [man] for protection, that her 
physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal func-
tions-having in view not merely her own health, but the well-
being of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed 
as well as the passion of men.81 
The Court's 1980-81 opinions, of course, superficially take a differ-
ent tack. In aid of upholding Congress' decision to exclude women 
from draft registration, despite unanimous support by top military 
leadership for their inclusion, Justice Rehnquist in Rostker82 finds 
76. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
77. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
78. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
79. Id. at 141. 
80. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
81. Id. at 422. 
82. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 81. 
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vague assertions of the hitherto impermissable goal of administrative 
convenience to justify the exclusion. He acknowledges with approval 
the Senate Report's finding that "[t]he principle that women should not 
intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and en-
joys wide support among our people."83 
Most disturbing in the Court's quest for a legal rationalization is 
its bootstrap argument that the exclusion of women from registration is 
justified by the constitutionally suspect, yet unexamined, exclusion of 
women from combat by federal statute and custom.84 The Court has 
twice before engaged in this specious reasoning. In Schlesinger v. Ral-
lard,85 it upheld a statute allowing female Navy officers a longer period 
than males in which to achieve promotion, on the ground that this com-
pensated women in part for the pervasive pattern of sex-based military 
regulations that otherwise burdened their advancement. Similarly, in 
Parham v. Hughes,86 the Court upheld a law denying the father, but 
not the mother, of an illegitimate child the right to sue for the child's 
wrongful death unless he had legitimated the child. Again the Court 
reasoned that this gender-based statute was valid in light of another, 
constitutionall~ unexamined, state law allowing fathers alone to legiti-
mate children. 7 As the third and most damaging instance in which the 
Court has engaged in this reasoning, Rostker bodes ill for future efforts 
to dismantle pervasive systems of discrimination. 
While Rostker might optimistically be dismissed as a matter of 
pure politics, the Court's decision in Michael M. v. Superior Court,88 
upholding California's statutory rape law, must be seen as a clear in-
stance of retreat to rational basis scrutiny, or worse. In Michael M. , the 
Court upheld a statute imposing criminal penalties on men, but not 
women, who engage in intercourse with a member of the opposite sex 
who is under eighteen years of age and not their spouse. The Court's 
plurality opinion first accepts and relies on the state's patently post hoc 
justification for the statute as a means of deterring teenage pregnancy, 
even though the state had twice before defended the statute on the 
grounds that it protected female virtue and chastity.89 In addition, de-
spite the fact that the state was unable to make any factual showing 
that the male-only criminal penalty closely served, or indeed, served at 
all, the goal of pregnancy prevention, the Court nevertheless upheld the 
statute on the bare assertion that it "protects women from sexual inter-
83. Id at 77. 
84. Id at 77-79. 
85. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). 
86. 441 U.S. 347 (1979). 
87. Id at 355. 
88. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
89. Id at 471-72. 
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course at an age when those consequences are particularly severe."90 
Thus, as in Muller, decided 75 years earlier, woman's "physical struc-
ture" presumptively justifies "legislation to protect her from the . . . 
passion of men."91 
The darker side of this "protection" emerges in some of the 
Court's employment decisions. In Dot hard v. Rawlinson,92 for example, 
women were "protected" from the possibility of being raped while em-
ployed as guards in a maximum security prison by the simple expedient 
of excluding them from that employment altogether. Pregnant working 
women likewise found little protection in the Court's reasoning in 
Geduldig v. Aiello ,93 which upheld their exclusion from an otherwise 
comprehensive program of disability insurance coverage. Holding that 
pregnancy discrimination is not "sex" discrimination, the Court stated: 
"The lack of identity between [pregnancy] and gender as such under 
this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. 
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant 
women and nonpregnant persons."94 
Michael M. and Rostker, particularly when read together with the 
Court's third sex case of the term, Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 95 demonstrate 
the ultimate plasticity of intermediate scrutiny. In Kirchberg, Justice 
Marshall, writing for the majority, strictly applied the test to strike 
down an already superseded state law giving husbands the unilateral 
right to dispose of jointly owned community property without the 
wife's consent. This trilogy represents a result Rex Lee professes to 
respect and expect under the intermediate scrutiny test. It serves to 
grant women "equality" when politically feasible to do so, and to with-
hold equality in controversial areas of fundamental importance. In 
protecting young women from the most onerous of civic obligations, 
for example, the Court in Rostker confirms the second class citizenship 
of all women. Another majority of the Court noted 130 years earlier in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford that a black in 1857 could not serve in the Army 
because "[h]e forms no part of the sovereignty of the State, and is not, 
therefore, called on to uphold and defend it."96 
The Court's recent decisions highlight the tragedy of the ERA's 
defeat. Never was a symbol of the nation's commitment to women's 
equality more sorely needed than it is now, when the Congress is con-
sidering constitutional amendments to ban abortion,97 federallegisla-
90. Id. at 472. 
91. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. at 422. 
92. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
93. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
94. Id. at 496 n.20. 
95. 450 U.S. 455 (1981). 
96. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 415 (1856). 
97. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
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tion to cut aid to school districts whose textbooks depict women in 
nontraditional roles,98 and other federal action intended to destroy the 
effectiveness of statutes protecting women's rights to equal educational 
opportunity.99 
As a practical matter, the Amendment would have had no effect 
on sexual morality, but it would have had an enormous impact on pub-
lic morality. As noted in the ERA's legislative history: 
[T]he basic principle of the ERA derives from two fundamental 
judgments inherent in the decision to eliminate discrimination 
against women from our legal system. First, the Amendment em-
bodies the moral judgment that women as a group may no longer 
be relegated to an inferior position in our society. . . . Second 
... (c)lassification bd' sex ... negates all our values of individ-
ual self-fulfillment. 10 
In the absence of a federal amendment, efforts will be focused on 
passage of state ERA's, continuing legislative reform, and persistent 
pressure on the courts to construe strictly the requirements of interme-
diate scrutiny. 101 Rex Lee's book should be of guidance to those seek-
ing to understand the deeply held beliefs and fears of many of those 
who most strenuously opposed the ERA. With knowledge may come 
the power to convince. 
lJrucilla Stender Ramey* 
98. See, e.g., S. 1378-H.R. 395, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (known as the "Family 
Protection Act"). 
99. See note 59 supra. 
100. Emerson, supra note 42, at 890. 
101. After this book review had gone to press, the Court held, by a bare 5-4 majority, 
that a state's maintenance of an all-female nursing school constituted a violation of Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection guarantees. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's ringing 
endorsement and rigorous application of the intermediate scrutiny test may signal a promis-
ing move back to the test's fundamental tenets and vitality. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982). 
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